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THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Richard E. Hayes

THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.
I., INTRODUCTION '
There are a number of Stiites which have the capacity to build
nuclear weapons today and may develop tne motivation to do so within
the forseeable future.

India, Paki.stan, Israel and ·south Africa were

listed in 1972 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute a~ keeping a nucl ea'r option open and 1 i kely to fac.e serious
I

security threats.in the near future; l

Other states,. sucti as Brazil

and Argentina, have refused to sign·the Nuclear Non~Proliferati-0n
.

.

.

. Treaty (.NPT) because they claim it might interfere with the peaceful
uses of atomic energy for economic development.
signed the Treaty, bu~ not ratified it.

,lapan and Egypt have_.

Moreover, states like West

.

.

Germany, whfch_ have signed and ratified, cannot be con·s i de red forever.
.

committed to non-nuclear status.

.

Article X of the NPT e_xplicitly

recognizes the right of states to withdraw from the Treaty on three
months notice.

International si_tuations and governments will change

in the .future as they have in the past.

Hence, policies will change.,

In short, there. are now . and wi 11 be in the future . nationa·1 decision'
-

.

ma~ers evaluating the costs and benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons ..
A large segment of the scholarly community and a number of statesmen

feel that further nuclear prol i feration--an incre_ase in the num-

. ber of states possessing
nuclear weapons--is dangerous.for
the worlc!
.
. .
'

and shou,ld be avoided.

.

.

'

This implies that they kno~ the effec:ts of

nuclear proliferation and that those ·effects are bad.

If these two

things are _known, then a11 that remains is to communicate them to the

.

'

2

deci~ion-makers in potential nuclear states. ·Unfortunately; however,
~riting on the subject ~f nuclear proliferation g~n~rally makes two·
errors.which greatly r_educe it~ influence _as policy advice.

First,

arguments ·and analyses of the effects of nuclear proliferation generally focus at the global level.

Nuclear proliferation is viewed as

bad for the international system as a whol~. While systemic affects
no doubt play a role in. national decisions, .t_hey are often ·subordinated t6 national considerations. Hence, analysis should focus on the.
effects-of nuclear acquisition on proliferating states themselves,
·
rather than on the world as a whole. Second, the study of ded_sions
.
.

to 11 90 nucleqr 11 and_ their ~onsequences have been d9minated by speculative research.

Analysts have failed to take advantaqe of the evidence

available from past cases of pfolife~ation .
. As a consequence of these two errors--ignoring the effects of:
acqijisition on th~ new ~uclea~ state and fail~ng tri study the past
· ~xperiences of the existing nucl~ar states iri a comparative way--t~e
scholarly literature on·nuc.lear proliferation has become largely irrelevant to deci.sion-makers in potential nuclear ·states'. This article
.. argues that there is· a need for examination of the .major propositions
· about the effects of nuclear pro.liferation on ~oth international sys~
tern and the_proliferating state.· It selects one proposition--that
d)rect economic costs of defense will rise following nuclear acquisition--for empirical analysis~

It invites, and urges othet scholars

to ,help move the study of nuclear proliferation ou_t of the realm of
I

informed speculation·,an·d into the field of testable propositions.

3
I I.

THE DOMINANT TYPES OF RESEARCH

The study of nuclear proliferation has been domi_nat~d by three
._ types o.f material--(a) case histories of the decision process.es by·
.

.

a

which
state has decided to 11 90 nuclear•~ or to refrain from doing
so; 2 (b} speculative effort~, to predict futur~ actions of states,
.

.

either the likelihood of· their deciding to join the nuclear club or
.

. '

.

.

their probable reaction to a decision of another stat~ to do so;3 and·
{c) ~bstract modeling exercises seeking to illuminate future international systems in which nuclear proliferation has already occurred. 4
Each- of these types o_f research considers' the ~ffects of nuclear
proliferation.

Studies.of past decisions about ".going:nuclear 11

in-

volve· efforts to determine the changes which decision-makers expe·cted
to occur in the i nternati ona l system when they decided to develop nuclear weapons capability .. S.peculations about future decisions seek
-

-

'

j

'

to establi'sh the expected outcomes from those decisio·ns·.

These spec:-

ul l3-tions' ar~ usually cast in terms of the chan-ges· in the: national and
iliternatfonal arenas which would result and the advc1ntages·or disad.

.

vantages which are therefore expected.

'

.

.

,

Modeling future international

systems involves the study of t~e characteristics of those systems
after proliferation and, directly or indirectly, of the changes
brought about by an increase in the number of nuclear powers.
This article does-not reject these types .of research.
'

them bas value, just as each has problems.

Each of

.

Whi,le the assumptions of

model_ing exercises are either untested or known to be false, they
allow greater rigor :than the tortuous process of tracing decisi_o_nmaki_ng history .. While the evidence supporting speculations about

4
future state decisions is incomplete, these studies do pro vi de 'policy
suggestions ,and evalu~tions tailored to the sp~cific issues confronting decision-makers at a specific point in time~

Whi1e decision-·

making histories lack sweeping generalizability, they are alert to
the subtleties of bureaucratic polttics and to. the situational dif-. ·
ferences which influence policy choices.

Decision-making histories

· usually focu~ on the pre-proliferaiion phase~ speculative analyses.
, on the decision itself and the period immediately following, while
modeling exercises tend to focus on a period well after proliferation
occurs.

a group,

As.

these three types of study allow evaluation of·

nuclear proliferationfrom a variety.of points of view, each of which
helps· to overcome the inadequacies of the .others.
Scholars using these approaches have failed, however, to fully
examine the evidence available to them.
.

-

.

.

. .

.

While there is a great deal

'

of information ·suggesting the changes which decisi6n-'makers and analysts expected to occur fol lowing an increase in the_ numbe.r of nuclear states, there a~e no studies w~ich focus on whether or not those
;

.

.

changes actually occurred following nuclear acguisltion.

Hence, the

research)s incomplete.· Neither advice nor warnings can be offered on
the ba~is that British decision-makers thought~they would reduce the
costs of defense by going nuclear.

Only evidence that cost.s were in-

creased or decreased will be convincing.

Those who would inflt1e.nce

policy. in this crucial arena must ,be· prepared to go beyond abstract.
· logic and speculation.

/.

5
'

.

III. ·rROPOSITlONS ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
'

.'

\

A... Expected Effects
Decision-making histories, modeling exercises and speculative
analyses have produced a set of folk wisdom about the effects of nucl ear proliferation.

At the international level, there is virtual

unanimity on the conclusion that nuclear proi'iferation is undesirable.
·The three arguments most often made in support of this con cl usi on can
I

.

.

.

- .

be stated as propositions~
Proposition 1:

-

'

·

Nuclear proliferation increases ·the probability
I

of nuclear warfare. 5
Proposition 2:

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by one state
will result in their.acquisition'by others. 6

Proposition 3:

Horizontal· nuclear prolifera1iibn (an increase in
the number of states possessing nuclear weapons)
will result in vertical proliferation (an increase
in the quantity or quality of nuclear weapons in
the hands

of

existing nuclear states) .7

Perhaps the mcist w'i dely researched proposition relating: to the ef- fects of nuclear proliferation is its influence on alliances.
•

;Proposition 4:

I

Nuclear proliferation tends to destroy or prevent
the formation of alliances. 8

This may be goo~ or bad· depend,ing on the desirability• of the alliances
involved;
When viewed from the national perspective, there ·is a great deal
of controve_rsy .. as to whether or not nuclear proliferation will tie

6

There are four general propositions whkh appear in, the

advantageous.

·literature on theieffects of nuclear proliferation at the state level.
I nteres tingly, two of these proposi ti ans are found in di-ametri ca lly
opposing form.:.-proliferation is expected by some analysts to increase
security, by others to reduce it; it is· seen as increasing the ·cost·
of defense by some authors, vs1hi le others see it as reduci nq those
costs ..
Proposition 5:

Nuclear weapons capability results in increased
independence of action, particularly in the fbr~ign policy arena. 9

Proposition 6: . Nuclear weapons c_apability results in increased
prestige and influence in forei._gn rel ati ens

,-lO

Proposition 7:

Nuclear weapons capability res·u1ts in increased
,.
ll
( decreased) security;

P.roposition 8:

Nuclear weapons capability res:ults in· decreased
•(increased) cost of defense. 12

Each of these propositions. focuses ~n an i ss·ue which deci s iori.
.
makers.and analysts concerned with nuclear proliferation consider important~

Thei,r evaluation. is difficult.

l:ach must be studied if·

policy makers in potential proliferating countries a:re to· makereasoned
choices.

Unfortunately, these propositions are seldom.stated expli•

•

I.

•

citly and even less frequently examined with rigor ..
B.

Can the P~opositions be Evaluated Wjthout Evidence?

The simplest, most often repeated and, .to ma·ny, the most con.vincing argument leading to the conclusion that nuclear pr~liferation Js

l

7
"bad"· is summeq' up in Propos·ition l, · "Nuclear. proHferation increases·
the probability of nuci ear warfare. 11

•

The text of the: Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons gives only one reason for the
I

.

_Treaty--that the states concluding it believe "th.at th·e proliferation
.
.
•·.
. ; ..
·,
.
of nuclear weapons woyld seriousJy enhance the danger;of nuclear war, 11
.

.

•

'

<

•

'

-

-

and that "devastation would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear
war. 11

The .1972 World Armaments and Disarmament.Yearbook, published

by the Stockholm Internatio~al Peace Research Institute, argu~s simply
that,

11

if ever usedI again, nuclear weapons .may .lead to an unlimited

human catastrophe--and the risks of use by any cause are likely to i.ncrease, at least to. some degree, the more independent possessor nations
/·

~here

are

in the world. 13 .

Many analysts have chosen to .deal with this issue t,y assumption
and logic.-. There a.re_, however, three problems with the argument~
First, it assumes that nu~lear warfare is the worst possible occur.:
\

rence for mankind.

SecC>nd, it assumes ·that the probability of nuclear

accident or warfare is ·dependent solely on the number of weapons possessed and the number of decision structures capable (deliberately or
inadvertently) of deciding tQ use them.· Third, it leads toward the
conclusion that having decided that the international system would be
• ,

I

•

· harmed by nuclear. proliferation; pplitical scientists are free to ignore issues relating to national costs and benefits of proliferation.
Is a nuclear accident or even nuclear warfare the worst possible
occurrence?

It would be difficult indeed to imagine any catastrophe

which mankind is capab~e of visiting upon itself which would be worse,·
than a full-scale nuclear war involving the· superpowers and including

i

8

the devastation of population centers.
the term

11

If this is what is meant by

nuclear'warfare 11 in Proposition l, as it is.apparently meant

in the text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the SIPRI Yearbook,
\

then their can be little doubt of ~ts inherent evil.
However, not all nuclear warfare would involve this awesome
level of destruction.

Situations involving limited or tactical uses

of nuclear weapons in preference to ·other, ·non-nuclear occurrences (:an
be forseen_.

_The defense of Western Europe against .conventional attack

has depended for years on prompt use of tacti ca 1 .nuclear weapons.
Smaller_ states may see ·limited nuclea·r capacity as a way of avoiding
c9nventional war by deterring larg~ neighbors.

The use o:f 'limited

nuclear capacity by Israel against conventional forces threatening to
overrun population centers might be viewed as preferable to the geno,

_ cide whi.ch could occur in the absence of that nuclear warfare.

The .

poi~t is\not that these possibl~ uses -0f nuclear ~eapo~s are good~
I-

,

-

•

but rather that there are ~ituations in which the use of some nuclea~
'

'

weapons may b·e_ preferable to solutions relying only on conventional
capacity. •- Hence, "nuclear ,warfare" cannot be presumed to· be inherently - evil under all circumstances.
Can 'itbe shown through simple application of iogic that nuclear
proliferation increase·s the probability of nuclear warfare? The argument may take two forms--(a) the greater·, the number of nuclear weapons
in the world the higher the probability that one win explode a,:id(b) the greate~ the number of decision struciures capable of initiating
.

-

.

:

'

nuclear warfare, the higher the probabi 1i ty one _wi 11 do so.- The -first
argument is weak because it can only be linked to nuclear warfare

9

throu~h complex scenaridus which th~mselves hav~low probabilities.
.

'

To result in·all out nuclear war, not only must the damage' from an
accidental detonation be believed to have been caused by

a

foreign

power, but also the isolated detonation must somehow set a process
. I

.

of nuclear/escalation in motion .
. By farthe,stronger argument is that nuclear 'pr9liferation means,.
by definition, an increase in the number of decision. structures cap~
able of initiating nuclear warfare.

If it is the case that th~ prob-

ability of nuclear warfare is dependent only on the number of deci~ion
'

structures capable of initiating it.and the 'probabiHty that any given
decision structure would do ~o is independent of the number of nucJear
states, then it would foll~w that an increase ih the number of n~clear
.

'

'

'

states will lead to an increase in the probability of nuclear warfare.

It appears reasonable to argue, however, that these two probabilities
are not independent.

The acquisition• of nuclear weap,ons by a new

state may result'in a reduction of thewillingness of its dec:isiori.

.

makers to place themselv~s in a confrontation with other nuclear state~.
.

.

'

.

Similarly, other nucl~ar states may allow the' new n·uclear power more .
freedom of action--be less willing to present threats to it~ perceived
vital interests.
1

An argument can be made that nuclear proliferation decreases the

, probability of nuc:]ear warfare.

Certainly the United States had a·

far higher probabil,ity of using 'nuclear weapons during the years in·

1

which sh~ possessed nuclear monopoly than at any time since. Is this ,·
1

argument unique to the change from one to two powers?

No .. The only r

impediment to nuclear warfare in a two power world is, fear of direct r

·retaliation . . Sufficient offensive force would allow first· strike
capacity and efforts to attain that force level_ mightset off a nuclear holocaust.

.A.dd a third ryuclear power ·and two factors change'.

Fi,rst, the amount of offensive force necessary to dominate the entire.
system must increase s~ffi ciently to all ow simultaneous destruction
of two, opponents.

Second, the danger inherent in attacking only one

other nuclear power in~reases greatly-;;.the· third' power could be left·
as the sole Strong... survivor.
,·

Each addition of a new nuc,lear power

"

in further increase~ in the amount .of force needed to dominate

results

the system a~d the danger involved in attacking a· portion of the sy~-1
tern.
\

.·The point of all .this is not that nuclear proliferation is good '
or e.ven that it can be logically demonstrated that i .t wi.ll change the
.

.

. pr.obability of nuclear warfare.

Rather, it is to demonstrate that

logic and assumption cannot, by themselves, answer these questions.
_Even if logic could demonstrate that nuclear proliferation is inher.

enqy evil for the international system, however, the obligation .of ·
'

.

political . scientists to exami'ne .the effects of nuclear.proliferat5on
would not be satisfied.

The decision to develop nuclear . weapons, or

t_o refrain from doing so, is made by national decision-mak.ers.

While

·. knowle~ge that proliferation is- bad for the international syst.em may

1

influence their deci si ans, domestic factors and the costs and benefits
.

.

.

to the state will also play an important role.
.

Situations in which
.

.

1

.

states seek unilateral short run advantage at the risk of serious harm
· to other parties, and even to th ems elves in" the long run are not ·un- ·
familiar to political scientists.

Empiri~al research into the effects

\

11
-

of nuclear acquisition on new nuclear states should, therefore, also
be carried out.
·IV.

PROPOSITION EIGHT:

A PARTIAL TEST,

This section seeks to demonstrate that understandin$ of the ef-

,.

fects of nuclear proliferation can be.
enhanced through
,
- a careful
'

ex-

I

ami nation of the experience of the nuclear states.
topic must be performed with caution, however.

Rese·arch on this

Contextual variables

cannot-be ignored since the number of cases available is too small to
permit the assumption that they are randomly distributed in the data
set.

MoreQver, the cost of erroneous advice or d~cision in the nu-

clear proliferation area is hig~.
.

·

R~search results, oartic~larly at

this early stage of analysis, must therefore be \interpreted
conserv..
"

.

'

;

'

atively and understood as tentative and suggestive rather than definitive.
Proposition Eight states,

11

Nuclear weapons capabtlity res·ults. in

·decreased (increased) co~ts of defense. 11
.

In the early ·l950's, the
'

British decision to: emphasize atomic weapon development was based
partially on this idea . 14 The French cl aim to hav~ reduced defense
costs whil maintaining nuclear forc.:es. 15
the opposite argument has been.made.

In other contexts, however,

The costs of development, de-

ployment, anc! maintenance of nuclear forces have_, for example, been
seen as a major i111pediment to an Indian decision to develop nuclear
16
weapons capacity, -and are asserted as the reason why.Britain gave
· up efforts to mai ritaih an independent nuclear. deterrent .
.

'

.

17

-

The proposition-implies that it is possible to substitute nuclear
capability for some other types of military capacity.

The substitution

- 12
may be direct (having-nuclear capaci~y may be exnected·to make defeat .
of an opposing state possible with fewer men and less materiel than if,
conventional weapons were utilized)

or

indirect (having nuclear ~eapons

may be expected to pre~ent or deter an attack by a,n opposing state,
thus ,reducing the level of general military preparedness whic;h is necP.ssary).
The issue of the cost of nuclear weapons is entangled in the pur~
pose for which military forces are mai.ntained.

For the powerful -states

of the world, -"defense" seems to _be defined more -broadly than mere ,
maintenance of-territorial integrity.
ence around the world.

It means maintenance of influ-

Hence, conflicts such· as-Korea, Indo-China,

Algeria, the Dominican Republic, Hungary, Viet:--Nam, Czechoslovakia
and the Suez adventure should be counted as part of the costs of de.

.

fense. for these states.

.

Where these conflicts occurred in the abience

of nuclear weapons, they represent part of the cost of maintaining in'

.

fl uence.

When they occur in spite of nuclear .weapons capability, they

are a type of influence maintenance which cannot be avoided through
· possession of those weapons.
B.

'

Measurement of Economic Cost

The analyses which fo 11 ow focus on direct cost of defense over
.

t:ime.
state.

.

.

'

..

ni rect' costs are the year to year military exp.en di tures of a·
Four different ~easures are utilized.

The absolute cost of·

defense, measured in constant value, is the first. _Second, the defense expenditure per capita is calculated.
I

This ·measure views the

- population of the state as a productive resource, with each individual

13
represel)ti ng a capacity to pay a portion of the cost

of. defense. Hence,

the absolute defense burden of each member of the population is one
measure which assesse$ the ability of the society to pay its military
bi 11 s.

Thi rd, the rate of change in defense expenditure is examined.

This provides a more precise basis for the evaluation of the cost of

,·

proliferation.

If a :prenuclear and a nuclear period each show high

and rising defe.n·se costs, determining which resulted in. the most rapid
rise in expenditure will indicate which would lead to a higher cost
overtime.

Finally,. the proportion of gross national product which

the state devoted to defense is used.

This measure takes into account

the ability of the eGonomi c system to bear the cost of the military ·
establishment.
A11 these measures rel ate to the direct cost of defense.·
are, of course, other costs.

There

Each dollar spent on defense represents

a loss of o·pportimity to spend the same.dollar for other societal.
goals.

The econpmic benefit of
'

a dollar

spent on defense may be less
'

'

'

'

than t_hat of a dollar delivered through a social security_system or
expended to improve schools or housing.

This preliminary analysis con-

_centrates on,whether direct cost is higher in nucle1r eras than others,
and leaves the implications of higher costs for the society for later·
study.
The experience -of each nuclear state· is evaluated .below.

Each

,

:state's history is di.vided into three basic P.hases-,;.(l) pre-nuclear .
'

(prior to governmental committment to develop nuclear weapons), (2)
nuclear development (.prior to first successful nuc.l ear weapons test)
•

'

•

••

•

•

,

I

1

and (3) pursuit of nuclear
deterrence.
'
'

'

,

•

-

Some variation occurs.because

14
. '

the experience of the states varies--f3ritain reduc'es costs thro.ugh
· cooperation with and eventual reliance on the United States for weapons
rese.arch and development; China had nuclear development phases \'!ith
and without Soviet assistance.
The data set spans 1949 through 1970, again with some· variation.
These boundaries are selected.on.the grou~ds that(~) th~ costs of
defense before 1945 are not comparable to those costs following that
_ye~r, (_b) · a combination o{the difficulty in obtaining reliable data;·:_
the demobilizatton of states f6llowing World War 11, and the economic
chaos which existed in much of the world dµri ng the 19.45-48 p_eriod
· make: it unwise to extend the analysis into this era and (c) 1970 is· ·
long enough after the last case of nuclear proliferation ·(China, -19_64)
to establish trends for all countfies.
Analyses are performed by the_ cornpari son of the experience of
~ach state in ~iff~rent periods of time.

These are identifi~d in

terms of (1) the nuclear status of th·e state and (2) _important contex.·,

tual variables, such as overseas conflicts, likely to influence defense
costs.. To reduce the influence of short term i di osyncraci es fo year- ·_- ·
to year sp'endfng, analyses focus on examination of trends· ov'er time
and the averages for periods of years.·· Direct cross-national comparisons are avoided.

There are several reasons.for this.

First, the

quality of available data about military expenditures is uneven, making
comparison misleading ..
.

.

' -

Second, no absolute
cost for·developmerit, de'

. .

,

'

ployment or maintenance .of nuclear forces can be set. · As technology
spreads through the 'world, the· cost of a particular achieyement declines.
,

I

.

•;

Different countries approached the same technological milestones at

. 15
different points in time, resulting in d1ffe,rent costs.

Cost also

depends on the scientific ·and technological community available within
the, country.
levels.

Third, not all countries are seeking the sa~e force

Differences in strategic position:and doctri_ne result in

different costs.

France spends tonsiderabiy less for her forces than

t:he US and USSR do for theirs.

Moreover; it is possible to lengthen

and.shorten the period of time over which costs are spread, thus re-.
· duci ng the burden on societal resources.

The French, for examp lie,

have several times postponed the date at which they intend to deploy
inter-continental ballisti.c missiles, 18 . thus reducing year to year
expend'ltures.
C.

1.

France:

Minor Nuclear Powers

A Clearcut Case

- The nuclear experi~nce of France can be divided into three distinct P,hases.

Pri.or to 1955, though some frenchmen were working

on

atomic weapons arid an agency had been set up to oversee development of
the appropriate technology, no formal government decision had been
made to seek nuclear capabi Ji ty and funding for the effort was 'at ·
•

relative low levels.

•

I

A form.al decision to develop

nuclear weapons

• i

· was·made late in 1954 and funding increases became·sizable in 1955. 19
The first French test explosion occurred in February, 1960.
.

.

i

Hence,

.

1949 through 1954 is considered a pre-nucle~r era for Franc~.

nuclear.development phase is 1955 through .1959.

The .

From 1960 on, the

French are seen as seeking independent nuclear deterrence capacity and,
paying the full costs of doing so.

•

I

I

. r

'l6
. Nuclear weapons are not, however, the only, factor influeric,ing
.French defense costs during the period under study. While 1949 and
·1950 were relatively peaceful years, the Korean and Indo-China ton. fl i cts were· important influences during the 1951 through 1954 period.
The cos ts of· the A1geri,an ci vi 1 war and the Suez expedition were.
borne during the 1955-1959 nuclear development. ·era. The end of the·
,

.

Algerian i_nvolvement in 1962 marks an opportunity for France to reduce conventional military expenditures.

Hence, five analytic -periods

are defined for France--1949-50, 195i-54, 1955-59, 1960-62 and 1963-70 .
.

.

Table 1 presents the data on direct economic costs to. France aggregated with these five analytic periods. Over time, the absolute
cost of defense has increased.

Each period, whether-peaceful or con-

flictual,
and regardless
of nuclear status, has.been marked by higher
..
'

-

.

,

absolute costs of defense than its predecessor. This trend is· st_rong
enough to carry over to the measure of absolute defense burden per
capita.

.

)

.

, .

'

Military expenditures have increased more rapidly than the
.

.

.

French population, .. so that each member of th~ society pays an increased

price for defense in eachera. The nuclear periods; this analysis
eras.
suggests~ are n_ot . less costly than the pre-nuclear
. .
.

'

'

Indeed, the

absolute costs and costs per person are higher ·after nuclear forces·
are developed.

This is true despite French disengagement from conven-

tional fighting to maintain the empire, a move which would be expected
I

to freduce military expenditures.
,,

\

i

Table 1 about here

,·.

i

i
· 1

I

A different .,image emerges when the other two cost measures are ·

.

examined. The rate of increase in defense cost rose'more rapidly in

11/

'11

TABLE l
FRANCE:
Dates ·

. ·1951-54

1949-50

Prenutlear

· Nuclear Status

- - - -· - - -,

Average Defense Expenditure in Millions of
Constant (1960) U.S.
Dollars
·
Rank Order

-

1960-62

Conflict

- - - - -

-

Conflict

- - - - -

Conflict

1928.50

3261.75.

3853.75

39(_)7. '67

5

4

3

2

Rank Order

46.39

75.03

4

5

Averag~ Change in. Defense.
Expenditure from.Previous
Year ·
Rank Order
.

- - - -

14.43%

2
.

'

: Average P~rcentage of Gross
National Product. for Defense
·Rank Order

-

l

.

- 8J)5

,

Peaceful

-.- - - -

~

..,

82-. 94

- - -

~

- - -- - - - '

,

-

~

86. 17

2

3

~

- - -

89. 88 ·

l

- - - - - - - - - .

.

A.14%

3.33%'

1., 0%

3

4

5

6.20

4.91

3

5

. 6. 95

2

-

4435. 13

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~

· Average. Per Capfta Expenditure in .Constant
(1960) U.S. Dollars.

.1963-70 _

• l'renuclear · ·Nuclear Development Seeking Independent . Seeking Independent
Deterrence ·
Deterrence

· Peaceful

Context

NUCLEAR Sl'ATUS' CONTEXr'AND DEFENSE COSTa

a) Defense.expenditure data taken: from World irmaments and Disarmament,•SIPRI Yearbook, 1972, Stockholm Internat,onal Peace
Research Institute (New York: Hunianiti es Press, 1972), supplemented by other volumes in the series. Population data and
national product .from International Fin·ancial Statistics, 1972 Supplement, International Monetary Fund (Washington~. o~.c.:
IMF, 1973).
b) 1950 only-~.". :

"-----

'•

---

-----------

the two 'pre-nuclear eras than in any period since.

This is surprising,

particularly since. some of the subsequent periods. (1955-59 and 1960-62).
contain sizable conventional military efforts (Suez and Algeria)· plus·,
)

the burdens of nuclear force. developmen~.
;.

Yet, the further the' French

-have advanced down the nuc·lear _road, the more slo_wly their.de_fense
costs have grown. 'A similar pattern emerges when the proportion of
GNP devoted to defense is examfoed.

As with rate of change in military -

expendit~re, the peacefu~ ~uclear era of 1963~70 is the least expensive
period for d~fens~, wit~ conflictual pre-nuclear bet~g the most costly.
In summary, then, France is paying more, in absolute terms, for
defense in th~ n_uclear era than during any other peri.od analyzed. This
is true in spite of reduction of French strategic responsibilities
around the world -and disengagement from colonial conflict's.

On the

other hand, going nuclear has permitted France to reduce the rate of .
-

t

•

'

•

growth .of military expenditure.

'

,.

•

This, along with ·a steady reco.rd of,.,

~conomi c growth, has resulted in a gradual reduction in the_ porti_on
of nati anal" effort devoted to mi 1i tary purposes. - Frehchmen pay· more
for nuclear defense, but are better able to·bear the cost.

The French

experience suggests that a large developed economy with.a steady rate
of ,growth may be able to pa.x the increased costs of nuclear weapons
without making serious sacrifices elsewhere.

2.

The United_ Kingdom:

A Muddled Case

Aggregating the data on the United Kingpom into useful eras
analysis is Somewhat tn,ore complex than it was

for

Fr~nce.
.

for

There -is
.

. , ....-

no.genuine pre..,-nuclear period witbin_·the data set. There was, in fact, .

no

periodof time following World War II in wlifoh the British goyernment

18
did not expect, to develop and deploy an independent atomic force . .An~;
· alysts do report that, consistent with the official British· policy of ,
assuming rio
war would begin.,within ten years I fo'llowing World War )I, _
.
the pace of nuclear development by the United Kingdom was slower than
it· might have been in the presence of some immediate threat.2° Hence,
nuclear development
phase were lower:
annual- expenditures· in the 1949-52
'
.
'

.

than those the society could have afforded. ·rrom 1953 through 1957,
the United Kingdom sought to develop and deploy an independent nuclear
force.
Beginning ·with the Blue Streak missile in ··1958 (which was _actually
an American rocket with an American guid'ance system), -the British began
reducing the cost of nuclear weapons by ;elying
~n the United States
.
'

.

'

1

-

to_ carry out important -portions of the necessary technol_ogical research.:
This p,er_iod of 11 p~rtially _dependent deterrence"· 1asted until the -cancellation of the_Skybolt program in 1962. 21

From 1963 through th,e end'

of the period being studied, the United Kingdom has sought to mainfain
deterrent capabiiity but has been heavily dependent on American development of weapon systems.
Contextua 1 vari abi es must a 1so be taken into_ account~
the

11

s·ecause of

no war for ten years" assumption mentioned~bove, ·the'years prior

_to the Korean war had artifici.ally low military expenditure.· Partially
as 9- consequence of this, the Korean_ war resulted in radicai increases
.

in expenditure.

-

-

These included not only costs necessary forttie main-

tenance of United Nations forces, but al so' a n_umber of expenditures
seen a:s essential in ·.light of the increased level of tens,ion between
- 22

East and West. ·.

1'

Interestingly, British involvement in Suez (1956-57) ·

19
does not seem to· have increased defense costs. · This permitted crea. tion of a reasonably-long analytic peiiod for the eva~Uati~n of the
..

.

.

.

,'

.·,

:

cost.·of seeking nuclea.r independence (1945-57) ..· Combining these con.

.

.

1

:

,_textual· facto,rs with the changes in nuclear status· discussed ea~Her;
six analytical -periods can be defined for the United Ki,ngdom--1949-50,
1951-52,-1953, 1954-57; 1958-62, ahd 1963-70.
Since there is no prenuclear era for Britain, ·an?lysis is undertaken from a somewhat different p~rs_pecti ve than that· used -in the
French case.

First, the cost of seeking independent deterrence _is

compared with partial and total dependenc.v..

If maintenance of nuclear
.,

forces increases cost of defense, and the United States has taken over'
. some of these _costs for the United Kingdom, then the dependent eras
· should be less costly than ·the independent deterrence period.

Second,

the French· data suggests that the decision to go nuclear :is costly in
absolute terms,but may allow a decrease in.rate of growth

of

arms ex-

penditure and a reduction of the proportion of GNP devoted to defense.
The nuclear development phase was more costly, in terms of these two .
·,i ndi ca tors, than was the independent pursuH of deterrence.

This finding :

can be ch.ecked against the British experience.
I.

Table 2 about here
Table 2 shows the indicators of British d·efense cost aggregated.
·into the six ·analytic periods.

As might be anticipated, the highe·st

absolute expenditure came in 1953, when the United Kingdom·was embark-

;·

fog on an effort for nuclear independence and th~ Korean war was ap- .
proaching a climax.

There is -only a small difference, however, between

the absolute cost incurred in seeking nuclear indepe,ndence during
~

. I

TABLE 2
UNITED KINGDOM: ·. NUCLEAR STATUS,_ CONTEXT AND DEFENCE COSTa
Dates ·

1949,-50

1951-52

1953

· 1954-57 ·

Nuclear Status

Nuclear
Development

Nuclear
Development

Seeking
Independent
Deterrence

:seeking.
· Independent
Deterrence

Context

Peaceful

· Conflict

. Conflict

Average Defence Expen,di ture
in Million~ of Constant
( 1960) U.S. Dol 1ars

3461 .00 ·

4935.00
3

·Rank Order

- - -

-

Average Per Capita Expenditure in Constant (1960) U.S.
Dollars
Rank Order
...;

- - - - -

Average Change in-Defence Ex~•
penditure from Previous Year
Rank Order

68.57

97.44

6
+6.40%b

i

2
..;.

·Average Percentage of Gross
National Product for Defence

- -

-· -

.

5718.00

4966-.50

4606 :so

4833. 38

1

2

- +4. 40%

7.93

2

l

3

.

4
+d. 10%

-5.08%

9.56-

- - - -- - -

87.73

3

8.81

'

4

96.79

6 '

- - - - -.

.

3

- -

6.27' ·
5

Rank Order

Peaceful

l

+23.90%

Seeking
Dependent
Deterrence

Peaceful

112. 43

2

Partial
Dependent
.. Deterrenc~

1963-70

Peaceful (Suez)

'

6

1958-62'

,4

.

6.48'
.

...

- -

,_

-4 - -

88.26
5
-:0. 25% ·
5

-· -· 5.52
6

··a) De.fence expenditure data taken· from World Armaments anci Disarmament, SIPRt Yearbpok; 1972, Stockholm International Peace
R~searchlnstitute (New-York: Hurhaniti_es Press;l972), supplemented by other volumes in the series.· Population data
. and.national product frominternationaJ Financial Statistics, 1972 Supplement, International Monetary Fund {Washington,
n.c: IMF, 1973).
"' "' ·'
b)

19.so· only~

20
peace (1954-57} and seeking to maintain interna'tional position through
co~ventional conflict while engagi~g in nuclear developm~nt (1951-52)~
Dependent deterrence (1958-70) is fess costly than independent efforts

{1954-57), as anticipated.

Data on per capita military ~xpenditure

are consistent with those for total cost except for some reversals of
rank orders (1951-52 and i954-57, 1958-62 and 1963-70) where the ab-'sol ute differences are not . large on either measure:
.

.

The percentage changes in military expenditure·from year to year
are also consist~nt with the French experience.

The greatest reduc-

:ti ons in .B.riti sh defense expenditure occur fn 1954-.57, when. peaceful
pursuit.of independent nuclear capability occurs. ,T'he greatest increas·es occur in the Korean war period as a result of the low arms
level in 1,949-50 and the general rearmament whi<::h accompanied that
conflict.

Mone of the deterrence periods (independent or ·,dependent)'
'

'

;

/

res~lts in increases in cost as great as those experienced-in the nuclear development ph~se, incl~ding the 1949~50 peaceful period.

D~-

pendent deterrence has been maintained with virtually no cost growth
and independent: deterrence was sought while overall defense spending
was reduced rather sharply.
The proportion of gross national product devoted to defense approximates ·the absolute cost pattern more closely than the rate ·Of .
change data, reflecting the overall slow rate of growth of.the British
economy.

1953, whi_ch involved substanti 91 overseas military involve-

ment and efforts at independent deterrence, is most costly in. these
terms.

The nuclear development, conflict period (1951-52) is close

. behind on this cost measure:.

Even in peacetime, seeking nulGear _

independence cost nearly-eight percent of GNP, compared with five and
one-half to six and one-half p_ercent for dependent deterrence or relaxed nuclear development.
The.experience of the United Kingdom does indicated, as did that
of France, that nuclear weapons capacity 'is expensi.ve. When a portion
of. the c'osts of maintaining nuclear weapons was passed on to the
United .States, the_ UK I s tota 1 defense costs fe 11 . - Three of the four
· -indicators show 1ower cos ts for the 1958- 70 eras than for the periods ,
in which independent capacity was sought.

Only the rate of change in

m1 litary expenditure shows a· different pattern, with large decreas.es ·
in military spendinqduring peaceful efforts at independence from
1954-57. Jhis is consistent with the French experien~e that nuclear

weapons cari be deveioped and deployed while the rate of increase in_
defense expenditure declines.

There i~ an important· difference, of

course, in that Fran~e has continued to maintain independ~nt forces,
- whi_le the _British found even the reduced costs too high to pay and. have
settled for a relatively stable level, of expenditu~e ~rid a nucle~r
force de.pendent. on American tethnol ogy.
• The second issue raised earlier for examination iri the British
case was.whether nuclear development is more or less costly than the
pu~suit of independent deterrence.

Comparisori with the French case

_is - complicated by contextua 1 factors.

The 1949-50 period reflects a ·

relaxed form of nuclear development, the 1951-52 period an exceptionally fast increase in costs because of the low preceeding expenditures.
I

"

,.

•

1953 is affected by the Korean war as well as'.the· change in British

22

nuclear status.

Still, some comparisons can bemade. The rate of

change in expenditure does show a marked difference between the 1951-·
52 and 1954-57 periods and this is in the expected direction--nuclear
development costs more tryan efforts at deployment_following the first
successful test. - The other three indicators show only small differences
between these periods, though only the absolute cost indicator is in.
- the opposite direction.
The findings for France and the United Kingdom are consistent·
-.

with the argument that nuclear acquisition is expensive--that it results-in increased absolute costs of defense •. At the same time, the
two: countrieS experience suggest that ~uclear, proiiferation can be
1

accompanied by a reduction in the rate· of growth in arrris expenditure
_of the state.

Once a country has experi ~need its first successful

nuclear test, these two cases suggest the proportion of gross national
Product devoted· to defense wi 11 decrease over ti me.
.

Finally, there is
'

.

some .support for the idea that the most costly period is the era in
which the state is seekfng to maintain its international position with
·conventi orial forces which .paying the acidi ti ona l costs of nuc;l ear de.:
velopment~. Any savings to be incurred, even in relative terms, come
after development of nuclear capacity.
3.

China: A Different Case

Evaluation of the cost of China's nuclear weapons program is com~
plicated by the poor quality of the ava-ilable information (both: in·
.

.

terms.of decision-making histories atid in terms of hard indicators
· such as defense expenditure and· GNP) and by" the difference between
China arid the other nuclear states.

In this analysis• the difference

23
in level of economic development is emphasized, though:cultural and
I

·other factors are no doubt also extremely important. · _The single fact·..
that China is a. developing· country has ·profound implications for the-·
'

.

.

.

.

analysis. Inc_reased population, regarded as an increase in·the cap_a-·.
-i:

bility of a developed society to pay defense costs, may be a liabili~y
in the developing country context.

Moreover, the ,indirec.t costs of

defense--diversion of skilled personnel, expenditures_ deferred in
other areas, etc.--are
likely to be higher in this case than for France
'
'

.

or the United Kingdom.
'

'

'

Chinese· nuclear development can be divided into four analytic
'/

periods.

Prior to i957 there was little effort or-intention to.de-:

velop n·uclear ·capacity, so the 1949-56. period can be term pre-nµclear1~
Discussion of nuclear acq.uisition began in 195.4;. efforts

-to

begin

serious nuclear development·about 1957. Russian cooperation lasted·.
23
until 1960.
· This period is termed "dependentnuclear development.''
From 196_1 through the first successful· test in 1964, China was involved
i~ i~dependent nuclear developm~nt.

The 1965 ·throug~ 1970 ~eriod is

characterized by pursuit of independent nuclear deterrence.
Contextual variables necessitate some further subdivision of the'.
Chinese experience.

The 1949;..50 period is a 1ow point for· the Chinese ·

economic system and includes great problems of societal reorganization
in the wake of the civil war •. Chinese intervention i.n Korea requires
that the 1951-53 period be .separated.

This 1eaves· 1, 954-55 as a remain:-

. ing peaceful ,. pre-n1,1cl ear era .. Later conflicts, such as the brief war
'

'

with India, do not appear to have hqd a great influence on military
·costs and have been ignored.

The increasing tensio_n· between China an,d

24
the Soviet Union through the 1960's must, however, he remembered as the
1

data are evaluated.

The Chinese·experience is divided into six analy:ti,c

· p~riods--1949-50, 1951-53, 1954-56, 1957-60, ·J961-64, and 1965-70 ..

-,

Data on Chinese defense costs, ,.population and gross national.
product are shown in Table 3.

To reduce the chance of erroneous anal- -

ysis due to data error, two_ different estimates of the information a~e
used wher:-e ayailable.

Unfortunately, the United States Anns Control_

and Di sarmamen:t Agency data do not exte.nd back before 1961 and are no;t . ·
presented ,in constant dollar form.

However, where comparisons were

possible, the t_wo data sets were quite consistent, suggesting that the ·
longer Stockholm International Peace Research Institute series can be

'

used with some degree of· confidence._ '

I

Tabl~ 3 about here

The patterns observed are very different from those in the ·previous c~ses.

Independent deterrence. costs more in ·absolute terms tha'n.

does dependent nuclear development.

This, in turn, has a higher cost!

than either dependent development or any pre-nucl ea~ phas_e, including .
the Korean war.
pre-nuclear eras.

Dependent development is no more expensive than the
P·er capita expenditure ·shows a pattern similar to;

. that of total defense cost. - Independent deterrence_ results -in

a higher .

per capita defense burden than nuclear development, which is again more
expensive than the pre-nuclear periods.

~lucl ear acqui s:i ti on is asso-:

ci ated with the reversal of a trend toward l.ower per capita defense
costs which had emerged during the· 1960 1 s.

Sino"".So\liet hostilities_·

should be remembered as a partial cause of these increasing costs,
since they, probably have forced maintenance of high conventional force
levels along with accelerated nuclear development.

f

.

TABLE 3
CHINA:
Dates .
· · So'urce
-Nuclear
Status.-.

1949-50

1951-53

.1954~56

1957-60

1961-64

1965-70

. 1965-70

SIPRia

SIPRia

SIPRia.

SIPRia

SIPRia

SIPRia

USACDAa

Prenuclear

Prenuclear

Prenuclear

Dep. Nuclear
Development

·-✓ Devel opmen

Peaceful

· Peaceful ·

Recovery

Context
Average Defense
Expenditures •in
Bns.- of Constant
{1970) Dollars ·
· Rank Order
Average Per
Capita Expenditures

-

,_

Peaceful

- - - - - - - - - - - - -

Conflictual·

--

2. 71 ·

4.05

6.92

5

3

6

4

2

l

4.84

5.27

5.64

8.69

3

. 4.09
\

3

_,

- - --·
-.1 • 23%
6

-

-

5.5

0%
5

._ 4.07
5.5

2

- - - +3.23%

+14.48%

4
~

.6.67
l

Raok Order

Seekinq Ind.
· Deterrence

2.50

+l0.0%b

. Average % GNP
Spent· for Defense

t

3.00

--

· Rank Orde.r

Conflict

Ind. Nucle'ar

2.63

4

Rank Order.

- - - - - - - -

Average·Change
· in Defense Expenditure

NUCLEAR STATU~, CONTEXT AND DEFENSE COSTa

- - - .. - -

Ind. Nuclear Seeking.IrDevelopment . DeterrencE
Peaceful

-

Confl ictUc

- - - - -

_,

7.5oc
2

l

l

- - -

+10.05%

l

2

- - - - - -

5. 35

.3.49

3.04

4~99

6.52

7.06

7.87

3

5

6

4

2

2

l

a) Defense expenditure data taken from World Armaments and' Disarmament,· SIP RI· Yearbook, 1973, Stockholm International. Peace
"'· Research Institute {New York: Humanities·Press, 1973), supplemented by other volumes in the· series and from.World Military·
Expen'd'itures, l97T~ Un1ted 'States·Arms Control and Qli§armament··Agency {Washington,· El.C.: 1973). Population.and gr-0ss na-:-_ .
tional product from Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., "China: Economic Policy and Economi.c .Results, 1948-71, 11 in People's Republic
.Of China: An Economic Assessment,. U.S. Conqress, Joint Economic Committee {Washington~ D.C.: ll.S. Government Printing Offic,·
. · 1972).
· ·
·.
.
.
.
.
.

'. :~{~J;~en°; 1;o llaY·s · .
'

'

'·
'

·· -

·
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The rate of increase in military costs, has been hi~her during the
independent deterrence and indepen,dent nuclear develop~ent eras than
others.

On this measure, however, development costs more than the

period following the first successful test.

Fin~lly, the proportibn

of national.production devoted to the military, which·had been declinih~ from 1949 through the -dependent nuclear development era, c11mb~d rapidly during the independent development and deterrence periods~
On ever'?/ measure, then, China's nuclear weapons program is associated with !increases in the direct economic costs ~f defense.
developing country, the costs of nuclear weapons appear high.

For a'

I

It should-

be stressed, however, that the rate .of increase in expenditure and the
. increasing proportion of 'the GNP devoted to national defense suggest
- that the Chinese are· seeking to develop nuclear capability more qu5ckly
. and- perhaps further- than either the British· or French.

Th'i s means that

their strategic goals have increased theprice of the development of
_nuclear forces.
·The low costs associated w_ith the 1956-60 dependent nuclear development .are also worthy of note.

While the pace of thi.s program was

undoubtedly slow, the relatively low costs incurred,' p;rticylarly when
_compared with the higher costs in the later independent development
period or with the French and British developme11t periods, are significant.

The-se low costs unders-core. the importance of Article: I of the

Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which nuclear states,agree_not'to aid nonnuclear states to develop nuclear ,capacity._ Apparently the costs of
nucle~r development can be _r.educed considerably when assistance is
provided~
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D. The Superpowers
The United States and the Soviet Union are the other two nuclear
states. They are analyzed together because (l} the level of military
spending and technology of these two states exceed those of any other,
country in ~he world and (2) there is no period within the span of
the analysis which can be tenned either ore-nuclear or nuclear develop•

ment for them.

I

.

The focus of the discussion is therefore, similar to
9

that utilized for the study of the British experience--the consistency
of the data with the findings for other countries.
The evidence from the minor nuclear states sugge?ts that the absolute cost of maintaining nuclear capacity will rise over time. This
would seem to be even more true for the superpowers which maintain massive forces an,d compete at the fringe of known weapons technology.

A

second issue concerns the trend in military expenditure over time. !lave
the superpowers experienced declining rates of increase in defense
costs (as have France and as did the United Kingdo~ ih the 1954-57
period) or does the rate of increase remain high, as in China? Third,
are the American and Soviet cases similar to the other developed nuclear
states in that the proportion of gross national product devoted to the
military declines over time?
The.direct military costs of the Soviet Union are presented in
Table 4.

Because of differences between accounting systems in the

Western countries and the USSR and because of difficulties in establishing currency exchange rates, the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (utilized as the standard source for defense costs
to other countries) does not attempt to produce constant value estimates

2-7
of Russian military expenditure.

Therefore, a recent article,by

Stanley Cohn, which presents two alternative estimates of Russian military costs, based on different_ assumptions· about hidden defense costs; ·
has-been utilized as the basic source.

The time periods utilized to

aggregate the data are al so based on Cohn's analysis and represent .
periods in which -he sees .international tension and .arms corppetition .
.
· - .
',
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levels as high (1950-52, 1961-63, · 1966-69) andI low (1953-60, -1964-65).
i
.
Average defense costs' for the 20 years _of avaflable data .are also
shown.

Unfortunately, -Cohn·provides data on the percentage of gross

national product expended tor d~fense only for seiected years.
Table 4 about here
The Soviet experience reflects the familiar pattern of steady .in-.
creases in the absolute cost of defense.

This is ·true of ·both total

expenditure and per :capita expenditure for military purposes.

It is

true~ moreover, qespite variations in the level of conflict experienced.
The pattern is consistent with the French an_d Chinese: experiences, sug'

'

gesting that_ independent nuclear forces have increasing costs over t.ime.
The rate of increase tn defense costs, however, varies with the l'evel ·
of international conflict.

Relatively peaceful eras (1953,.;60, 1964-65)

have the sma 11 est arms cost i ricreases, while ·conflictual phases have
,,

higher rates.

The proportion of GNP devoted to defense,shows a similar

pattern, though these figures are available in only selected.years.
The last two measures of the Soviet experience somewhat contradict the
I

Br:itish and French cases in which fndependent nuclear forces are associated with· decreasing portions of societal resources spend for
defense.

.

TABLE.4
SOVIET UNION:

- - - - - - -"- -

1953-60

· 1961-63

Conflictual·

· Peaceful

Con fl i c tua l

- - -. - - - - - - 22877
8.97
8.90

r) SIPRI $ Mn.
2) Cohn, .A Rubles Bn •.
3) Cohn, B Rubles Bn.

Average
Defense
·Expenditure

l 950-69a

1950-52 .

Dates
"Context

c·osr,

CONTEXT AND DEFENSE

23495 ·
11.50
10. 71

- - - 28651
18.40
16. 13

1964.:.65

.1966-69

1950-69

Peaceful

Conflictual

Average

37069
26.52
17.70

27648
16.08
13.88

... -

- - - - - - - -

31071
20.75 . ·
17.70

..__

-

3

2·

l

56.93'
53. 15

82.94
72.72

90.39
77 .11

112 .82

4

3

/2

l

+19.45%~
+21.65%

+3.24%
+l.11%

+14.53%
+14.57%
+l5.87%

"."4.05%
+l.25%
-0.55%

l.5'

4

l.5

5.

- - - - - -· -

Average Per
l) Cohn, A ,Rubl~s
Capita Defense 2) Cohn, B Rubles
. Expenditure
Rank Order

48.85
48.47
5

Average
Change in.
Defense
Expenditure

l) SIPRI
2) Cohn, A
3) Cohn, B

Rank Order

- - - - - - - - - - .- - l)

Average
Percentage
of Gross
,;;.National .
·Product for
Defense

Cohn; A

1950-11.6
1952-14.3
1950-14.3·
1952-14.0

2) Cohn,· B,

Rank Order

~

- -· - -

~

- - - - - - - - - ·- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - +ll.33%.
-1.99% .

- - - - - '

- - - -

4

5

Rank Order

1

- - -1955-12.3.
1960- 9. 5
1955-12.3
1960-8.6

4.5

- - -

~

- - - - - - - ,- -

- - -

+4.38%
+7.98%
+6.75%

+8.52%
+10.]5%
+7.37%
3

~

.

1965-11.7

1969-12.8

12. 14c

l 963-11 .4

1965.:. 9.9

1969,"." l O. 0

11. 03c

- - - ·-

4.5 ..

-

- - - - - -

1963-12.8

...
- - -· - - - taken'from-~~orld Armaments; and Disarmanient,
- - -

- - -

74. 14
64.48

8ti.~e

3

- - - - - - - - - - -

a) Defense ex.penditure data
SIPRI Y~arbook,' 1972, Stockholm International Peace·
Research Institute (New Yor:k: Humanities Press,-1972}, supplemented by other volumes in the series and from Stanley H•
. Cohn~ ."EconomicBurden of Deferise Expenditures,11 Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies, U.S.·Congress, Joint Eco,, •. ·'"-nbmi-c•cbmmittee· (washingtoh·, D.C;-: -u~·S; Governmenj:·F>rinting·--office,"1973) Defense'as''percentage Bf gross national prod'l'..ict ··
. :also_ from Cohn and population data from Frederick A. Leedy, "Demo.graphic Trends· in t_he USSR," in Soviet Economic Prospects
b) 1951 and 1952 only. '.
··
.
· '
·
·
c) Includes only years show_n in previous columns.
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Table 5 about here
The United St~tes data, presented in-Table 5 contains few jurpri~es.

First, while ihe absolute cost of defense has risen over

time, the increase is irregular and appears to be influenced by conr.
< ventional military involvement.

.

.

Second, ·the rate of increase in mili-

tary expenditure is much slower than·"might be expected. - If the hu~e.

_

.. -

.

:

(113%) increase in spending for the first year of the Korean war is
· ignored, U.S. mi 1i tary spending has increased at an average rate of '
less than three percent per year, and shrank during relatively ·peaceful
eras.

Thi rd, the Vi et-Nam conflict has apparently interrupted an i r-

regular, but clear, tendency for the proportion of American_ GNP devoted
to defense to decline.

Th1s tendency, which is consistent wi_th· the

French and British experiences, appears to be reasserting itself in
the 1970 1 s.
E.

Conclusions about Proposition Ei~ht
.

.

.

\ Before con cl us ions are drawn, a ,word of cauti ori is in order.
There are few cases available for analysis on this topic.

.Moreover,

, some of the data utilized is, of necessity, based on estimates.· As a
result,the research performed may be more helpful in clarifying the_
issu,es and focusing discussion than in prov,idfog a
proposition under examination.

11

real 11 - test of the

Conclusions are, th~refore~_ tentative

·and presented in the hope that they will form·the basis for other,
more definitive analyses.
The proposition beinq ·examined states, "Nuclear weapons capability
.

..

-

results· in decreased (increased} defense costs .11 Evi d_ence examined in:cl udes two measures Of absolute; direct costs of defense :(mi_litary

I

, I

TABLE 5
UNITED STATES:
bates

1949-50

Context

-

_-.

- -. - -

.l\verage Defe_nse Expendi ture in Millions of Con~tani (1960) U.S. Dollars
Rank Order

-

-

-

- - -

-

Average Per Capita
Defense Exp~nditure

- -

· Peaceful

1951-53

17201.00
6

-

-

-

113. 37

1954-60

· Conflictual
-·

111111

-

-

48394.00

- -

CONTEXT AND COST, 1949- 70a

-4

306.65

. 1961-63

"

l 964.-6fr

1966--70

Average 1949--1970
--

Peaceful

Conflictual

Peaceful

Confl i ctu'aJ

·46055.70

49688.33

48719.00

63704.00

-

5

2

3

1

266.36

252.32

317.46

- - - - - - - 266.53--

- 48499. 91

268.34

'

Rank Order
Average Change in Defense.
Expenditure

6

2

- - - - - - - - +6.6%b

+52.03%

3.5

-

3.5

4

- - - - - - - - -

-2.40%

+3. 73%_.

- 1. 90%

1

- - -

+3.62%

+8. 16%

+2.77%C
· Rank Order

- -

~

2

1

6

3

5

4

9. 13

7.84

8.81

5

4

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -. - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Average Percentage of
Gross National Product
for Defense

5. 19

Rank Order

6

1.2~54

1

. 10. i2

2

3

,-

- - -

9.36

-

.--

-

a) Defense_ expendifure data taken from World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook, 1972, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute .(New York: Humanities Press, 1972), supplemented by other volµmes in the series. Population data and
gross national product from Inter.national Financial Statistics, 1972-Supplement, Interriat-ional Moneta~y Furid (Washington,
D.C.: IMF, 1973).
.
b) 1950 only
c) Excludes 1950-51 increase

-

- - .________ . -
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expenditure and military expendittire per capita), the ~ate of change in
I

defense spend_ing and the proportion of gross national product devoted
to defense.

Exploration of the data country hy country has resulted

in the identification of several intervening variables of potential
importance--rate of economic growth, occurrence of conventional conflicts, level of economic and technological develop~ent and overall
size of economy. ·The purpose of this section is· to review the evi denae
on a cross-national basis, attempt to evaluate the relationship between
.

\

nuclear capacity and each measure of defense and, in so far as is pos;..
sible, determine which intervening variables appear most importc1nt in
light of the ~vailable evidence.
The two measures of absolute defense cost have shown highly
· similar patterns and can be discussed together.

On an absolute cost

basis, nuclear acquisition is associated with ·increased defense costs.
·France, the Unite_d Kingdom and China all experienced their highest ·
levels of military expenditure and military expenditure per capita
when attempting to develop, deploy and maintain independent nuclear
forces.
The rate of change in defense costs presents a somewhat more complex picture.

France and Britain·experien'ced slower growth of mili..;
/

tary expenditures in their nuclear phases than in earlier eras.

China

had the opposite.experience. The French and British experienced higlt
conventional defense costs immediately prior to going nucl_ear, and
these- continued on into the early phases of nuclear independence. _Hence,
there is a period of time in which they are payfog both high conventional defense costs and nuclear costs.
fall, the total military bi 11 falls.

When the conventional co?ts

30

Noting that of the five nuclear powers only the

I

u:s.

has. gotten

involved di-rec_tly in large scale conventional hostilities since developing n~clear capacity, and remembering the argument that nuclear
states will be more cautiou~ about involvements than non-nuclear states
and wi 11 be given more maneuvering room by others..,_ the generalization
that rate of growth in military expenditure declines with nuclear
· capacity appears to receive some support. · The defense costs of the
.

'

United States and ihe Soviet Union reflect a pattefn

1n

which the rate

of change in defense cost is associated with the. level of internati on:a:1
tension a~d conflict.

The Chinese case, in which the. pursuit of in-

dependent nuclear capability is associated with both accelleration in
the rate of spending on defense and with .international
conflict (China-.
.
-

'

,

'

1

India conflict of 1~62 ~nd Sino-Soviet.ho~tilities of the late 19~0;s)
is also-consistent with this explanation.

The exp.erience of the nu~lear

states suggests, then, that the level of conventional conflict and nu. clear status both influence the rate of change.in defense cost.

The

linkage between these two phenomenan should be studied ir;i greater
detail.
In addition, the evidence is consistent with the argument that
thrise willing to settle foi a minimal deterrent force (Frante, Britain)
may ·be able· to go nuclear while re_duci ng defense expenditure, while
those desiring the latest technology and the need to upgrade weapons,
systems in light of new developments.·· If a decision to -go nuclear is,
.

.

-

.

.

made·for·purposes
of presti9e and•international.•influence2
it may·be ·
'
.
. '··-<
.
. .
.
.'
◄.

possible to· reduce· defense· costs,· pro-vi ded ·a· 1arge ·etor'iomi c · system with
a· ,steadJ' pattern of growth is available.

•

i

3l ,,

The: proportion of. gross nationiil product expended for- military
purposes is an important variable in the analy~is becaus.e it -measures
the cost of defense against the capacity of the society to pay.

The

.results.of the analysis for this variable are simil~r to those for
rate of change in defense expenditure.

France, the United Kingdom

and the Unit~d Statei prior to the beginning of the Viet-Nam war all
_show a decreasing proportion·of GNP for- defense while seeking nuclear
I

,.

•

ii

independence.

Given the high°'military spending of the early 1950 1 s·

to support conventional conflicts, the di se'ngagement of the French and
Brit_ish from colonial conflicts and the American -increase for Viet-Nam~
the level -0f conflict appears to be•a plausible explanation.

The Soviet

· expenditure pattern is consistent with this explanation. The lowes_t
portions of GNP for defense coincide with the 1owe st 1eve 1s of tens ion.
· China, with increasing costs in conflictual, nuclea_r periods also fits
this pattern ..· Nuclear capacity reduces defense costs, in tenns of
_/

proportion of GNP, if and only if it is associated with decreased levels
of ,international conflict. ' ·
V. - SUMMARY

Analysis of nuclear proliferation has failed.to focus ·sufficjently
.

\

on the experience of the 'five nuclear powers.

As a result, a litera- ·

t"ure has emerged which is rich in propos ttions abot,Jt the eff~cts of nucl ear proliferation, but lacki~g in efforts to evaluate those proposibecause. there
. tions systematically. This is I p~rticul~riy unfortunate
,
I

.

.

are decision makers in the world who are evaluating the advantages and
disadvantages of seeking nuclear capability.
J

These people cannot be

·1
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influenced by argument or assumption. , Greater e·fforts should be made
' to eva l u~te effects · of pro literation through the examination of the
evidence available from previous cases of proliferation.

Moreover,

I

analysis must focus on 'the effects of nuclear acquisition on the .pro-·
liferating state as well as on the international system.
As a step in this,direction, an examinatfon of the direct economic
costs of defense in the five nuclear states between
1949 and 1970 was_
'

'

undertaken.

.

Several tentative conclusion~ emerge 'from these analyses:.

First, pursuit of independent nuclear capability is generally associ-11
ated with rising defense _experidi tu res, whether measured in terms of · ,
total military costs or defense expenditure per capita.

Second, China,

the only developing country in the analysis, has experieryced high rates
of increase in defense spending during· nuclear development and while seeking to.establish a deterrent force.

By contrast, the indu~trial-

ized nuclear states have been able to reduce the rat~ o~ incre~se in
their military expenditure while- building nuclear forces.

Third, both

r~te of change in defen~e c6st and proportion of gross ~ational product
devoted to the military establishment have b~en reduced in nuclear
_states __ if- and when conventional military involvement is avoided.
Two important implications flow

rrrim

these findings.

It may be i

·possible for a state with a sizable industrialized economy and a steady
'

rate of economic'growth to construct

a limited

nuclear force intended

primarily to increase prestige and freedom of action while at· the same

,

.

'

•

.

.

, I

time holding defense costs .at -relatively low levels.

Empirical analysis

to determine whether France, Britain and China have_ gained in interna.,1

ti.onal prestige, influence or independence of action should therefore_

.(

C
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